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In 2005, North American Bison Cooperative formed a contractual alliance with
North Dakota Natural Beef, LLC. The alliance was formed in order to enable the
cooperative to enhance returns from its physical and managerial assets by entering
the natural beef market. This case describes the resources shared by the cooperative
and LLC, how the alliance was governed, the risk of opportunism by the CEO
and associated trust building and control mechanisms, and the beneﬁts cooperative
members received. Although the two companies operate under different business
principles, cooperative members exercise indirect control over the resources they
contribute to the venture.
Introduction
The North American Bison Cooperative (NABC) was formed in 1993 with 330
bison producer members in the United States and Canada. It processes and dis-
tributes bison meat products and increases public awareness of bison meat product
characteristics. The cooperative was formed for two reasons. First, prior to its for-
mation, a consistent supply of large volumes of bison was not available from a
single source. Second, forming a marketing services provider would reduce an in-
dividual bison producer’s costs.
In 1994, the cooperative opened a bison slaughter and processing facility in
New Rockford, ND. The plant was initially designed to process 5,000 head per
year, but growing demand for bison led to expansion. By 1999, the plant processed
8,000 head annually and expected to process 10,000 head per year by 2000. How-
ever, expanding supplies from other processing companies and declining demand
for bison caused market prices to drop. In early 2003, prices remained relatively
low, although sales reached US$22 million (Pates 2003). Furthermore, prolonged
low bison meat prices led to an accumulated inventory of frozen bison meat, some
of which was more than three years old. Although inventory liquidation efforts
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had started, the cooperative had more than US$20 million in deferred payments to
members with unsold inventory (Associated Press 2004). NABC had also acquired
New West Foods, a bison marketer, and Great Plains Food Co. to help distribute its
products, but there were no apparent cost savings. The former NABC board chair
commented that “much of the co-op’s problems involved the inherent makeup of
the board...who didn’t have experience running this type of business. They didn’t
have the experience to know how to challenge numbers” (Pates 2003). As result,
the cooperative board declared bankruptcy in October 2004. By July 2005, with the
inventory on its way to being liquidated, the cooperative emerged from bankruptcy,
but needed to increase its business volume in order to cover ﬁxed operation costs.
The new president/CEO of NABC, Dieter Pape, considered the cooperative’s op-
tions.
Pape knew that one way to use the cooperative’s assets more intensively would
be to enter the natural beef product market. Consumer preference for food produced
with environmentally friendly practices and free of hormones and antibiotics led
to an increase in demand for natural and organic products in the previous decade
(Shelquist 2002; Smith, Swalla & Ennis 2002; Pirog 2004). Retailers responded
to this demand by increasing the number of natural food stores, such as Whole
Foods, and mainstreaming natural and organic foods in traditional supermarkets.
Pape also knew that consumers were willing to pay a premium for natural beef
products relative to conventional beef products (Grannis & Thilmany 2000).
Beef producers in North Dakota were aware of these changes in the market. A
2005surveyofNorthDakotabeefproducersreportedthat58percentofrespondents
would be interested in implementing a natural beef production program (Cook et al.
2005).Atleasttwofactorspreventedthis,however.First,productioncostsofnatural
beef were 10–20 percent higher than conventional production due to the longer time
for an animal to achieve ideal market weight. Producers believed, however, that the
premiums that consumers were willing to pay for natural beef would offset these
higher costs (Boland & Schroeder 2002).
A second factor was a lack of beef slaughtering facilities in the state. North
Dakota Beef Producers had discussed opportunities for developing beef slaughter
facilities prior to the 2005 alliance. In 1991, for example, a study of costs to export
beef cattle to Japan was conducted and speciﬁcally mentioned that a beef slaugh-
ter facility in North Dakota, designed to meet the speciﬁc requirements of beef
exported to Japan, would have a positive economic impact on the state (Stearns,
Petry & Marchello 1993). In 1993, a group of North Dakota beef producers tried
to develop a cooperative beef marketing company named Northern Plains Premium
Beef, but failed to commence operations due, chieﬂy, to lack of capital.
In 2005, a meeting of beef industry stakeholders was held at the North Dakota
State University (NDSU) Carrington Research facility to discuss new ideas about154 Journal of Cooperatives
beef product marketing. Among the attendees were Pape and Dr. Ken Odde of the
NDSU Department of Animal and Range Science. During the meeting, Pape and
Odde discussed starting a natural beef company that could build upon the synergies
of harvesting, processing, and marketing natural bison, as well as aid the univer-
sity in its research and education mission. This idea led to the formation of North
Dakota Natural Beef (NDNB), a North Dakota corporation, in October 2005. The
company aimed to accomplish three NDSU goals: enhance the growing of cattle
feeding and processing in North Dakota; enhance NDSU’s research capacity; and
provide an educational facility for NDSU students interested in meat careers. The
relationship between a public university and a private company enabled the two
groups to take advantage of US$800,000 in funding made available by the North
Dakota legislature, as well as a federal grant of US$1 million. At the start of this
venture, Pape wondered how a partnership of a limited liability company (LLC) and
a cooperative, linked through a contractual alliance, would affect the cooperative’s
governance.
Description of the Venture
North Dakota Natural Beef, with total sales of approximately US$2.7 million
between April 2007 and September 2008, processes and markets natural beef prod-
ucts. Naturally raised beef cattle are sourced from three to ﬁve feedlots operating in
North Dakota. These are shipped for slaughter to the North American Bison Coop-
erative facility in New Rockford, ND. Although the New Rockford plant operates
below capacity today, the NDNB business plan estimates that between the third and
ﬁfth year of operation sufﬁcient volume will be achieved to reach capacity. Because
no beef slaughter facilities were available in North Dakota prior to the venture, the
shorter travel distance reduced transportation costs (formerly to Nebraska or other
Midwest states).
After slaughter, beef carcasses are shipped for fabrication, packaging, and dis-
tribution to NDNB’s renovated 41,000 square foot facility in Fargo. North Dakota’s
largest city, Fargo provides access to a supply of labor and is a convenient location
relative to the nation’s interstate freeway system. Its proximity to NDSU also pro-
vides access to scientiﬁc expertise at the Department of Animal and Range Science.
NDNB received managerial, sales, and administrative staff from NABC. Pape,
president and CEO of NABC, became the president and CEO of NDNB. The sales
and marketing staff for NABC were the initial sales staff for NDNB. NABC also
provided administrative services for NDNB, including use of NABC’s chief ﬁnan-
cial ofﬁcer, controller, and human resources manager. The NABC staff had worked
together for some time and understood the difﬁculties associated with starting a
new company and the amount of time required to establish marketing relationshipsVol. 23[2009] 155
with retail and institutional customers. Once the alliance started, NABC’s market-
ing team immediately began working to market natural beef products through its
already existing system of retail and institutional customers.
Conceptual Framework
Contractual Alliances
Firms use resources in order to generate a comparative advantage. The strategic
alliance literature indicates that the competitive position of each ﬁrm in an industry
can be “deﬁned by a bundle of unique resources and relationships” (Rumelt 1981).
When necessary resources to establish a competitive advantage are lacking, such as
when they are imperfectly substitutable, a ﬁrm may trade or cooperate with other
ﬁrms out of “strategic necessity” (Das & Teng 2000).
Resources are imperfectly substitutable when they are property or knowledge-
based (Das & Teng 2000). Examples of resources with clearly deﬁned property
rights include physical and human resources. Physical resources are imperfectly
substitutable because the location of one resource relative to other resources may
be unique. Human resources are relatively immobile and the performance of a sin-
gle employee or group of employees cannot be duplicated unless the whole set is
acquired or permission to use them is obtained. Knowledge-based resources are not
easily substituted because of information barriers.
Firms may enter into alliances with each other in order to either acquire or
retain bundles of unique resources and relationships, such as facilities, personnel,
and connections. Alliances are useful for the acquiring company when not all the
resources possessed by the target ﬁrm are valuable to the acquiring ﬁrm. Alliances
are useful for the target ﬁrm when it seeks, for example, to retain unique resources
that are currently under-utilized (Kogut 1988).
If the alliance between two ﬁrms is principally characterized by an exchange
of property-based resources, a unilateral contract-based agreement is typically used
(Mowery, Oxley & Silverman 1996; Das & Teng 2000). These contracts establish
a “well-deﬁned transfer of property rights” (Das & Teng 2000). In these alliances,
each ﬁrm carries out its obligations to the other in relative independence and little
collaboration or integration exists between the partners. Because the transfer of
property rights for use of physical and human resources is well deﬁned, a complete
contract is sufﬁcient for specifying the role of each partner.
Alliances and Corporate Governance
Alliances between companies usually require added corporate governance costs
and some loss of organizational control (Das & Teng 2000). Corporate governance156 Journal of Cooperatives
involves managing the strategic and policy decision-making process of the com-
pany and distributing proﬁts. Challenges may arise within the alliance when the
governance style for each partner differs and leads to incompatible preferences for
strategic planning and proﬁt distribution. The alliance partners in this case study are
incorporated as a cooperative and as an LLC.
Cooperatives govern themselves based on principles of user ownership, user
control, and user beneﬁts. The decision-making process of cooperative businesses
is done through a user-elected board of directors that are the user’s agents (or rep-
resentatives) in the management process. Votes for directors or policies are cast
democratically, with each user allowed one vote regardless of how much business or
equity capital they contribute to the company. Cooperatives obtain capital through
lending, direct investment by the users, or retained proﬁts, which are either held as a
deferred beneﬁt to be given to the member in the future or kept solely for the com-
pany’s use. Investment decisions will always be made by a board that represents
the current users, so the cooperative structure causes users to be more interested in
current income than in making a ﬁnancial investment in future income. This is be-
cause users will be reluctant to bear the certain costs of investment in exchange for
restrictions in the transferability of the residual ﬂows from an asset, which will be
controlled in part by a future board (Bonin, Jones & Putterman 1993). This problem
is traditionally referred to as the horizon problem.
In contrast with cooperatives, LLCs govern themselves based on principles of
investor control and investor beneﬁts. The decision-making process is done through
a shareholder-elected board of directors who act as the shareholders’ agents in the
management process. Votes for directors or policies are cast in proportion to owner-
ship.LLCsobtaincapitalthroughlendingordirectinvestmentfromshareholders.In
a liquid market for ownership in the company, the relationship between ownership
and beneﬁts is clear. A stockholder can sell the expected future stream of beneﬁts
to another investor by selling their share in the company. This ease of transfer also
facilitates decision-making for the ﬁrm because investors who do not favor certain
policies can sell their ownership to those who do. Hence, in an LLC, current in-
vestors always bear the costs and receive the beneﬁts of investment.
Opportunism in the Governance of Corporate Alliances
In addition to resource management, Das and Teng (1998) consider the im-
portance of risk management to the success of a contractual alliance. One form
of risk unique to an alliance is relational risk. Das and Teng deﬁne relational risk
as the probability that one or more members of the alliance will perform actions
out of compliance with the intended spirit of interﬁrm cooperation. Research indi-
cates that interﬁrm cooperation is required for strategic alliances in general (Lei &Vol. 23[2009] 157
Slocum 1991; Parkhe 1993). The ability of alliance partners to preserve this coop-
eration depends on the costs and beneﬁts of cooperation. If both ﬁrms act in their
own self-interest, “hurting their partners and the joint task” may occur when one
party to the agreement decides that beneﬁts from cheating may exceed those from
complying with the agreement (Das & Teng 1998). Such behavior, referred to as
opportunism, takes many forms, including “shirking, distorting information, [and]
stealing the partner’s skills, clients, and personnel” (Das & Teng 1998). Because
some of these actions are unobservable to investors, opportunism can be a form of
moral hazard.
Various devices are employed to mitigate the risk of harm associated with moral
hazard from managers. Commonly used devices in the literature include stringent
controlmechanisms,contracts,andsharedequityownership.Thebusinessliterature
indicates that a high degree of interﬁrm trust between partners may eliminate the
need for contractual clauses (Das & Teng 1998). Das and Teng also hypothesize
that alliance partners may insist on speciﬁc roles for the inputs that they contribute
to the venture, such as managerial control.
Analysis of the Venture
NDNB and NABC became economically interdependent through a contractual
alliance. Their interdependence features an exchange of resources. This exchange
may satisfy NABC’s objective to retain its physical and management resources, and
NDNB’s objective to obtain resources that allow it to enter the natural beef market
at a relatively low cost. Although the boards of directors from the two companies
function independently of each other, NABC’s investment enabled the alliance to
beneﬁt from the perspective of agricultural producers who had run a business while
also removing the investment horizon problem that would have existed had individ-
ual cooperative members been asked to invest in NDNB. The interdependence of
the two companies remains subject to risk of opportunistic behavior.
The Contractual Alliance
The contractual alliance between NDNB and NABC created a clear transfer of
property-based resources between the two ﬁrms. NABC made two resources avail-
able to NDNB. First, NDNB was able to use the cooperative’s physical resources
of the New Rockford, ND slaughter facility and the cooperative’s management
team. Second, NABC made available its knowledge-based resources of pre-existing
contacts between its sales team and retail outlets catering to health-conscious con-
sumers.
The economic interdependence between the two ﬁrms beneﬁtted the stakehold-
ers of both companies. By forming an alliance with NDNB, NABC planned to158 Journal of Cooperatives
increase patronage refunds for the cooperative and reduce associated operations
costs. This will occur as the costs associated with starting a new business, which
are distributed across all the stakeholders of NDNB, are incurred and proﬁtability
is achieved. As NDNB becomes proﬁtable, the percentage of NDNB proﬁts cor-
responding to its ownership share will be given to NABC, and then allocated to
its members. NDNB beneﬁts from the comparative advantage in the natural beef
market by acquiring an experienced management staff at a lower cost than if it had
purchased its own management team, and obtaining instant access to sales relation-
ships with retailers of healthy meat products.
The alliance demanded little integration or collaboration between companies,
making a unilateral contract appropriate. Common management coordinates each
step of animal processing at the two facilities. Furthermore, because bison and nat-
ural beef are likely to be imperfect substitutes, NABC’s marketing knowledge was
a knowledge-based asset used by NDNB that cannot be taken away.
Governance
NDNB’s stakeholders decided that the business would be structured as an LLC.
This decision was motivated by at least two factors related to corporate governance.
The ﬁrst was the recognition by some investors that a beef producer serving on the
board of directors might have a conﬂict of interest between the proﬁtability of his
ownproductionactivitiesandthatoftheﬁrm.Someintervieweessuggestedthatthis
may have occurred on the NABC board and contributed to its bankruptcy. Investors
decided that having a board whose objective was to maximize shareholder, rather
than producer, welfare would diminish the likelihood of any conﬂict of interest. For
a summary comparison of NABC and NDNB’s governance attributes see Appendix
A.
A second factor that led to incorporation as an LLC was the recent experience
of agricultural producers with closed membership cooperatives, or “new generation
cooperatives,” such as NABC. These cooperatives encourage efﬁcient use of physi-
cal assets by requiring members to agree to delivery obligations to the cooperative
in proportion to ownership. If NDNB were to have incorporated as a closed coop-
erative, members would have incurred delivery obligations. The limited number of
ownership shares, whose minimum number is determined at incorporation, would
have made it difﬁcult for new natural beef producers to participate in the venture
and restricted beef supply to a limited number of active members.
TheNDNBboardorganizeditselfdifferentlyfromtheNABCboard.TheNDNB
board has several committees, whereas the NABC board has one committee. The
NDNB board has an executive committee, which provides signature power for the
chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer and others. NDNB also has a ﬁnance committee that reviewsVol. 23[2009] 159
the company’s budget. A review committee was also formed to assess the perfor-
mance of the president/CEO. In contrast, the NABC board addresses company af-
fairs as a single group. NABC board members attribute the difference in board
structure to the length of time (approximately four years) that the current group
of directors has served together. Also, even though the geography represented by
the NABC and NDNB boards is similar, the NDNB board meets every three weeks,
either by teleconference or in person; the NABC board meets less often.
Although the LLC business model was selected in order to decouple the interest
of the producer and the company, the board beneﬁted from the experience of beef
and bison producers. One board member produces natural beef and four directors,
including two bison producers who represent NABC, produce agricultural products.
Production experience enabled the board to understand why certain breeds of cattle
are important for meeting consumer preferences or achieving various cost targets,
as well as the importance of timing sales to obtain yield or other characteristics
from the cattle.
Eventhoughmembercontrolisanimportantcomponentofcooperativebusiness
governance, its inﬂuence is only indirectly felt in the governance of NDNB. One
way that the cooperative member’s voice has been represented is through the two
NABC board members who are also members of the NDNB board. In practice,
however, these two act as investors to the project, not as the cooperative members’
representatives in the governance of an LLC.
Another possible way to include the NABC point of view on the NDNB board
has been to give the president/CEO a seat on the board of directors. A common
practice in stock-held companies, the manager comes to the board with an under-
standing of how decisions made by the board will affect company operations. Also,
asthetenureofthemanagermayexceedthatofboardmembersduetooftermlimits
or election outcomes, the presence of the manager serves as a source of institutional
memory for the board.
Having the manager on the board also presents various challenges. Because the
purpose of the board is to make decisions for the good of the company, the man-
ager may, in fact, only serve as an employee representative and neglect the interest
of shareholders or NABC’s members. The expertise of the manager with respect
to operational aspects of the company may dominate the board’s focus and cause
members to ignore strategic planning, performance management, and other policy
functions. Finally, because the other members of the board are elected, what would
be the rationale for having an appointed position? Or should the manager or another
employee be elected by a set of stakeholders, such as employees or producers? Nei-
ther of these two methods is used to represent NABC member interests in the LLC,
giving the members of the cooperative the same status as other potential investors.160 Journal of Cooperatives
Corporate governance also affects the distribution of proﬁts from a company to
those who supply its ﬁnancial resources. In cooperatives, ﬁnancial beneﬁts accrue
to members in proportion to their use. However, the investment made by NABC was
done as a corporation rather than by the membership. This avoided the cooperative
business requirement of patronage refunds or other direct member ﬁnancial beneﬁts
to NABC members. Instead, the income from the investment in NDNB is treated as
income from any other investment in entities outside the ﬁrm. All ﬁnancial beneﬁts,
such as increases in the value of equity shares or stock dividends, accrue to NDNB
shareholders, including NABC, in proportion to their ownership share.
Corporate Finance
The decision to form an LLC was also motivated by at a factor related to corpo-
rate ﬁnance. Stakeholders had a desire to allow persons other than beef producers to
invest in the company. Equity capital was generated for the LLC through a “private
stock offering,” a means of raising capital that is exempt from federal registration.
This exemption has the beneﬁt of simplifying the equity collection process. The
stock offering is done with a document called a private placement memorandum,
which contains an overview of the proposed business plan, opening and closing
dates, and other terms. The exemption requires compliance, however, with certain
requirements, including not publicly advertising the opportunity to purchase stock
and that most stock must be sold to investors meeting certain qualiﬁcations. Be-
cause the group of investors obtained by this method is typically small, investors
are usually contacted directly about the opportunity to purchase stock, and inter-
ested parties reply to the company directly. These offerings can be done annually.
By virtue of incorporating as an LLC, the composition of the NDNB board was
based on ownership share. Upon incorporation, stakeholders in the company sought
equity and debt capital from various sources. A capital campaign was conducted
with the objective of raising between US$3,500,000 and US$4,500,000. By the end
of July 2006, the minimum was raised from 34 investors. Besides the members
of the bison cooperative, a total of 33 other investors organized the company, in-
cluding North Dakota Farmers Union, Dakota Growers Pasta Company, Goldmark
Real Estate Partners, and beef ranchers in North and South Dakota, Minnesota, and
Washington. Among these investors are producers, agribusinesses, and professional
groups headquartered in North Dakota. Each has various levels of ownership. Ad-
ditional debt capital was provided by the Small Business Association and the Bank
of North Dakota. NABC currently owns approximately twenty percent of NDNB
and has rights to two seats on the nine-member board of directors.Vol. 23[2009] 161
Opportunism
By virtue of forming an alliance, both NDNB and NABC incurred relational
risk. Das and Teng (1998) hypothesize that partners in an alliance with high rela-
tional risk will “focus on placing their own people in key positions of the alliance.”
In the alliance between NABC and NDNB, NABC supplied ﬁrm-speciﬁc compe-
tence in the areas of planning, operations, marketing, and human resource manage-
ment by allowing Pape and his management team to split their time between the two
ﬁrms. Given that NABC devoted its management team to the development of the
alliance, it was interested in making sure that its management team was in primary
control of the ﬁrm.
In such an alliance, the partner not providing the managerial control might be
skeptical of the other partner’s intentions. The CEO makes decisions about sharing
human resources across the two ﬁrms and, to some extent, the ﬂow of returns to
both companies. If Pape were to engage in opportunistic use of human resources,
it might impair the objective of NDNB to enter the natural beef market, as well as
the objective of NABC to enhance returns from its physical and managerial assets.
Both ﬁrms could have serious problems sustaining the relationship if skepticism
leads either partner to not commit itself to cooperation.
Only limited data were provided about speciﬁc types of opportunism monitored
by the NDNB board. As noted, because NABC and NDNB share a CEO/president,
a key source of opportunism could be the distribution of assets and associated input
costs. Although a complete description of formal efforts to distribute resources and
input costs was not made available, interviewees indicated that three mechanisms
have been used to measure the distribution of effort of any NABC employee work-
ing for NDNB. First, each employee completes a time slip detailing their effort for
each company. Second, Pape is required to keep a daily log of how his time is used.
He indicated that, because NDNB is at a very early stage in its lifecycle and NABC
is a more established company, a relatively large share of his and his staff’s time
is spent operating NDNB. Third, ﬁnancial statements for aggregate management
team expenses are reviewed regularly by NDNB’s board of directors and compared
with the expectations of board members. Pape recognizes that the NDNB board is
still becoming familiar with him and expects to have to demonstrate his capacity to
successfully run the two businesses simultaneously.
Other devices have been used by NDNB to reduce tension created by relational
risk. First, equity incentives are used to provide constraints on performance incen-
tives beneﬁtting the cooperative’s members. At the start of alliance operations, the
cooperative agreed to own a 10 percent share of the business. However, by meet-
ing established performance standards, it could add another 10 percent every year
for two years, for a total ownership of 30 percent. Since operations have started,162 Journal of Cooperatives
this agreement has resulted in NABC gaining a 20 percent ownership share. The
cooperative has chosen to limit investment in NDNB to this level.
Another device used by NDNB to reduce relational risk is an auditing ﬁrm. The
name of the auditing ﬁrm was not revealed during the data collection process for
this article, nor was the scope of its tasks. A committee comprised of members of
the NDNB board selected the auditing ﬁrm. At present, the NDNB board meets
every three weeks by teleconference or in person and can review information from
the auditor during these meetings.
NDNB uses a compensation instrument to share relational risk between the
managementteamandthealliance.Keymanagementpersonnel,includingtheCEO,
CFO, and vice presidents of sales, marketing, and human resources, receive imagi-
nary shares in the company known as “phantom stock.” Although no actual equity
in the company is given in this type of compensation program, it does provide some
of the same behavioral incentives as employee stock purchase plans. Although the
details of the NBND plan were not provided, these imaginary shares typically rep-
resent a promise on the part of the company to pay, on a ﬁxed date, a bonus to
employees based on either the value of these phantom shares or a value that follows
changes in the value of its actual equity stock.
A ﬁnal, but difﬁcult to measure device used to reduce relational risk has been
the development of trust. A member of the NDNB board indicated that concerns
about personnel placement and cost allocation were brought up during negotiations
between NDNB and NABC prior to commencement of operations. This person in-
dicated that these negotiations had the effect of establishing trust in communica-
tion between the two companies. Another event that contributed to the trust be-
tween companies was the fact that NABC presented Pape to the initial supporters of
NDNB as a person who had turned around troubled businesses, including NABC.
The level of conﬁdence that the NABC board had in Pape’s abilities was high at
that time. An indicator of NABC’s trust in Pape is his statement that he has not
had a formal management performance review since being employed by NABC.
This trust has, in effect, been transferred through the presence of two NABC board
members on the NDNB board. Counterbalancing this trust, however, is the fact that
the NABC board holds ﬁnal approval for adjustments to Pape’s salary.
Only time will demonstrate whether these devices sufﬁciently reduce the incen-
tives for opportunism by the management team. Since the start of alliance opera-
tions, members of the board have described the degree and quality of information
about resource use and cost allocation exchanged between Pape and the NDNB
board as “improving.” The risk of economic loss for the alliance remains if the pos-
sibility of opportunism cannot be sufﬁciently controlled to engender trust between
the companies. In this case, NABC member returns would decline because it would
have been unable to reduce average production costs, and NDNB would have toVol. 23[2009] 163
replace the physical and managerial resources. The amount of risk, however, may
change as NDNB matures. As more stakeholders become involved in relationships
with NDNB, it may be possible for the NDNB board to identify managerial re-
sources that are substitutable for Pape and his NABC team.
Conclusions
The contractual alliance between NDNB and NABC has enabled both com-
panies to utilize resources that create a comparative advantage for each in their
respective product market. NDNB uses existing marketing knowledge to establish
relationships with retailers quickly, has access to experienced management at a rel-
atively lower cost than if they had purchased one hundred percent of the manage-
ment team’s time, and processes cattle produced in North and South Dakota more
cheaply through the use of in-state facilities. NABC retains its experienced man-
agement team at a lower cost than employing the team 100 percent of the time and,
by obtaining proﬁts from its investment in NDNB, increases ﬁnancial returns to its
members. The alliance required little formal interaction between the two companies
except to schedule the use of physical facilities. Formal devices are used, however,
to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior by Dieter Pape, the CEO and president
of both members of the alliance.
The contractual alliance did increase the amount of complexity for governing
NDNB, but the fact that the two companies operate under different business princi-
ples does not contribute to this complexity. Although the bison cooperative enjoys
the beneﬁts of being governed by a group that understands the complexities of agri-
cultural production, NDNB receives a similar beneﬁt by gaining as board members,
agricultural producers who invested in the company. The members of the cooper-
ative indirectly receive ﬁnancial beneﬁts for sharing their investment in the New
Rockford facility with NDNB, as do the shareholders in NDNB.
References
Associated Press. 2004. “North American Bison Cooperative CEO Conﬁdent of Future.”
Agweek, 23 November.
Boland, M.A., and T. Schroeder. 2002. “Marginal Value of Quality Attributes for Natural
and Organic Beef.” Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 34(1): 39–50.
Bonin, J. P., D. C. Jones, and L. Putterman. 1993. “Theoretical and Empirical Studies of
Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?” Journal of Economic Literature
31(3): 1290–1320.164 Journal of Cooperatives
Cook K., T.G. Rime, W. Eide, K.G. Odde, M. Marchello, P.T. Berg, T.D. Maddock, K.R.
Maddock Carlin, and G.P. Lardy. 2005. “Survey of Cattle Backgrounding and Finishing
Feedlots in North Dakota, 2005.” Unpublished, North Dakota State University
Das, T. K., and T. Bing-Sheng Teng. 2000. “A Resource-Based Theory of Strategic Al-
liances.” Journal of Management 26(1): 31–62.
Grannis, J., and D. Thilmany. 2000. “Marketing Opportunities for Natural Beef Products in
the Intermountain West.” Dept. of Agr. And Resc. Econ. AMR 00-02, Colorado State
University.
Kogut, B. 1988. “Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives.” Strategic Man-
agement Journal 9(4): 319–332.
Lei, D., and J. Slocum, Jr. 1991. “Global Strategic Alliances: Payoffs and Pitfalls.” Organi-
zational Dynamics 19(3):44–62.
Mowery, D. C., J. E. Oxley, and B. S. Silverman. 1996. “Strategic Alliances and Interﬁrm
Knowledge Transfer.” Strategic Management Journal 17: 77–91.
Parkhe, A. 1993. “Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theory and Transaction Cost
Examination of Interﬁrm Cooperation.” Academy of Management Journal 36: 794–829.
Pates, M. 2003. “Bison Co-op Sales Sign of Better Times.” Agweek, 27 January.
——. 2003. “Pulling in the Horns: Former Chair of Bison Co-op to Sell the Ranch.” Ag-
week, 3 November.
Pirog,R.2004.“ConsumerPerceptionsofPasture-raisedBeefandDairyProducts.”Leopold
Center, Iowa State University.
Rumelt, R.P. 1981. “Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm.” In R. B. Lamb, ed. Competi-
tive Strategic Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 556–570.
Shelquist,K.2002.“PastureRaisedProductsMessageandStrategyConsumerFocusGroups
Study.” Unpublished.
Smith, M., M. Holmes, and J. Ennis. 2002. “Literature Review of Consumer Research, Pub-
lications, and Marketing Communications Related to Pasture-raised Animal Products
and Production Systems.” Unpublished, Iowa State University.
Stearns, L., T. Petry, and M. Marchello. 1993. “The Economics of Exporting North Dakota
Beef to Asian Paciﬁc Markets.” Dept. of Agr. Econ. Agricultural Economics Report
309-2, North Dakota State University.Vol. 23[2009] 165
Appendix A.





Board Committees Multiple Committees Committee of the whole
Composition of board Mostly non-agricultural
producers
All bison producers
Homogeneity of board Represent several sizes of in-
vestment
Represent several types and
sizes of bison producers














Director compensation Zero salary; Mileage and per
diem expenses for corporate
travel;
Deferred compensation
available for board members
who accept and hold options
for ﬁve years
Zero salary; Mileage and per
diem expenses for corporate
travel;
Compensation same as
ﬁnancial beneﬁts to all other
members, in proportion to
use
Director tenure limit and
term length
Variable lengths of terms:
three, two and one year;
Maximum tenure of ﬁve
years
Three three-year terms are
the limit per director
Geographical allocation of
directors
None; seats based on
ownership share
Two-at-large; Two from
Canada; Four from U.S.